Mica Spady v. Bethlehem Area School District by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-1-2015 
Mica Spady v. Bethlehem Area School District 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Mica Spady v. Bethlehem Area School District" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 942. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/942 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3535 
_____________ 
 
MICA D. SPADY, Individually and 
as Administratrix of the Estate of Juanya Demore Spady, 
                                             
 
 v. 
 
THE BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT; JOSEPH 
J. RAY; HARRISON BAILEY, III; CARLTON RODGERS; 
JOHN AND JANE DOE #1; SUSAN DALTON, RN; 
KATHLEEN HALKINS, RN; JOHN AND JANE DOES 2-X 
 
         Carlton Rodgers, 
                                            Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5:12-cv-06731) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
______________ 
 
Argued June 2, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN, and VANASKIE, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 1, 2015) 
 
 
 
Audrey J. Copeland, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin 
2 
 
620 Freedom Business Center, Suite 300 
King of Prussia, PA 19406 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Steven C. Ameche, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Richard J. Orloski, Esq. 
The Orloski Law Firm 
111 North Cedar Crest Boulevard 
Allentown, PA 18104 
Counsel for Appellee 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.  
 This action stems from the death of Juanya Spady, the 
fifteen-year-old son of Appellee Mica Spady.1  Juanya died of 
what appears to have been a rare form of asphyxiation known 
as “dry drowning” or “secondary drowning,” shortly after his 
participation in a mandatory swimming class run by his 
physical education (“P.E.”) teacher, Appellant Carlton 
Rodgers.  Spady filed suit against Rodgers and the Bethlehem 
Area School District (“BASD”), claiming violations of her 
son’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Rodgers moved for 
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, which 
the District Court denied.  Because we agree with Rodgers’s 
contention on appeal that his conduct did not violate a clearly 
established constitutional right, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order denying summary judgment with instructions to 
grant summary judgment in Rodgers’s favor.    
                                              
1 For clarity, we will refer to Mica Spady as “Spady” 
and to her son as “Juanya.” 
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I.  
 The facts of this case, as the District Court aptly noted, 
are “undeniably tragic.” 2  Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. 
Dist., No. CIV.A.12-6731, 2014 WL 3746535, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
July 30, 2014).  In November 2010, Juanya Spady transferred 
to Liberty High School, which is part of the BASD.  A 
fifteen-year-old, tenth-grade student, Juanya was enrolled in a 
variety of classes, including a P.E. course taught by Rodgers, 
who had been a full-time P.E. teacher at Liberty for 
approximately four years and was a certified lifeguard.   
 As part of the P.E. curriculum, students rotated into a 
two-week swimming course conducted at Liberty’s 
swimming pool.  During the last week in November and the 
first week of December of 2010, Juanya’s P.E. class was 
assigned to the swimming course.  As per Rodgers’s policy, 
students were required to be in the pool for the entirety of 
each class or risk having points deducted from their grade.  
This policy applied to non-swimmers as well as swimmers.  
Rodgers acknowledged that he was made aware that Juanya 
could not swim.   
 The classes were all taught in the same fashion, with 
Rodgers standing at the side of the pool and instructing the 
students for approximately 20 minutes on a specific stroke.  
After each lesson concluded, students were allowed to swim 
freely in the pool.  In addition to Rodgers, a student lifeguard 
also was “on duty,” although such supervision usually 
consisted of monitoring the pool from a reclined position on 
the bleachers.  Non-swimming students could remain in the 
shallow end during the entirety of the class, but were also 
permitted to venture into the deep end by holding onto the 
side of the pool, a practice referred to as “gutter grabbing.”  
                                              
2 As we are obligated to do in reviewing a motion for 
summary judgment, we recount the facts in the light most 
favorable to Spady, the non-moving party.  Frank C. Pollara 
Grp., LLC v. Ocean View Inv. Holding, LLC, 784 F.3d 177, 
179 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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Aside from these general procedures, there were no course 
policies governing instruction or swimmer safety.   
 On December 2, 2010, Juanya’s first class of the day 
was P.E., which commenced at approximately 8:20 a.m.  
After roll was taken, Juanya entered the pool and swam in the 
shallow end for the first ten to fifteen minutes of class while 
Rodgers instructed the students from the side of the pool.  At 
the conclusion of the lesson, Juanya departed the shallow end 
and began to “gutter grab” around the edge of the pool.  
While in the deep end, he ran into a group of students and 
was submerged for a matter of seconds, possibly inhaling or 
swallowing water as he resurfaced.  Juanya then exited the 
pool and told Rodgers that his chest hurt.  Rodgers responded 
by telling Juanya to sit on the bleachers for a few minutes.     
 Several minutes later, Rodgers went over to check on 
Juanya, who requested permission to remain out of the pool 
for the rest of class.  Rodgers denied the request and told him 
to get back into the water.  Juanya followed these instructions 
and stayed in the shallow end for the remainder of the period.  
The students vacated the pool at approximately 9:00 a.m. and 
proceeded to the locker room to change.   
 A few minutes later, Juanya reported to English class, 
which began at approximately 9:16 a.m.  His teacher reported 
that he was attentive.  Abruptly, at around 10:30 a.m., nearly 
an hour and a half after he left the pool, Juanya fell backward 
from a seated position and hit the desk behind him.  As he 
rolled off his chair and onto the floor, he began to have a 
seizure.  Teachers observed labored breath, general 
unresponsiveness, and a pink, frothy fluid escaping from 
Juanya’s nose and mouth.  A school nurse attempted to revive 
Juanya while they waited for medical assistance.  Shortly 
thereafter, paramedics took Juanya by ambulance to St. 
Luke’s Hospital.  He died later that day.   
 During the course of this litigation, Spady provided an 
expert medical report opining that Juanya died of a condition 
known as “delayed drowning,” Supp App. 4, or “secondary 
drowning,” which can occur when a small amount of water or 
other fluid is inhaled into the lungs.  If the fluid is not 
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removed, the lungs begin to spasm, causing a build-up of 
other fluids, which in turn can cause the victim to asphyxiate 
because the lungs cannot oxygenate the blood.  This condition 
can cause death anywhere from an hour to a day after the 
initial inhalation of fluid and is extremely rare, accounting for 
“only 1%-2% of drownings.”  Supp. App. 83.   
 In December 2012, Spady filed this civil-rights action 
against numerous parties, including Rodgers and the BASD, 
who are the only remaining defendants at this juncture.  
Spady asserted that the defendants violated Juanya’s 
constitutional rights, triggering liability under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  More specifically, Count II of the complaint alleges a 
Fourteenth Amendment due-process violation premised on 
the state-created-danger theory of liability against Rodgers, 
and Count IV raises a claim of municipal liability against 
BASD based on a theory of deliberate indifference.   
 After the close of discovery, Rodgers moved for 
summary judgment as to Count II, asserting that qualified 
immunity precluded liability.3  By Memorandum and Order 
filed July 30, 2014, the District Court denied the motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that a genuine dispute of 
material fact existed as to whether Rodgers violated Juanya’s 
constitutional rights.  Spady, 2014 WL 3746535 at *5.  The 
District Court also concluded that because it was unclear 
“whether a constitutional violation actually occurred,” it need 
not determine whether that right was “clearly established.”  
Id. (citing Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 208, 211 (3d Cir. 
2007)).  Rodgers timely appealed.     
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343(a)(3), and we have appellate jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 by way of the collateral order doctrine.  
                                              
3 BASD also moved for summary judgement on Count 
IV.  The District Court denied summary judgement on Count 
IV and that ruling is not before us. 
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Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 985 (3d Cir. 
2014).  “It is well established that an order denying summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds may qualify as an 
appealable final decision under the collateral order doctrine” 
where the appeal presents a pure question of law.  Id. at 986 
(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–30 (1985)).  
“Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a 
particular time, so that a public official who allegedly 
violated the right has no qualified immunity from suit, 
presents a question of law[.]”  Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 
510, 516 (1994).  Therefore, we have jurisdiction to consider 
whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly 
established on December 2, 2010.4 
                                              
4 Seizing upon the following language from Curley—
“‘[i]f, and only if, the court finds a violation of a 
constitutional right,’ the court moves to the second step of the 
analysis and asks whether immunity should nevertheless 
shield the officer from liability,” 499 F.3d at 207 (quoting 
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007))—Spady argues we lack 
jurisdiction to consider whether the asserted right was clearly 
established on December 2, 2010.  Spady’s argument is 
without merit.  Curley neither speaks to our jurisdiction, nor 
limits it in any manner. 
We also take this opportunity to clarify Curley, which 
the District Court cited in declining to reach the “clearly 
established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis.  The 
process for determining the applicability of qualified 
immunity discussed in Curley was set out in Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194 (2001).  Under Saucier, courts were required to 
first decide whether a constitutional violation actually 
occurred, and only then consider whether the right at issue 
was clearly established at the time of the violation.  Id. at 
201–202.  This rigid system of analysis was overruled by 
Pearson v. Callahan, which provided that courts should 
“exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two 
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 
addressed first.”  555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  Under either test, 
however, the court may not deny a summary judgment 
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III.  
 “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects 
‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.’”  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 
(2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).  
In considering the applicability of qualified immunity, courts 
engage in a two-pronged examination.  First, a court must 
decide “whether the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown make 
out a violation of a constitutional right.”  Pearson, 555 U.S at 
232.  And second, the court must determine “whether the 
right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of 
defendant’s alleged misconduct.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Courts may begin their consideration with either prong.  Id. at 
236.   
 Here, the District Court began with the first prong and 
analyzed Spady’s constitutional claim under the state-created-
danger theory, which is an exception to the general rule that 
“[t]here is no affirmative right to governmental aid or 
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citing Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).  We adopted this exception in 
Kneipp v. Tedder, where we explained that a plaintiff must 
show the following: 
                                                                                                     
motion premised on qualified immunity without deciding that 
the right in question was clearly established at the time of the 
alleged wrongdoing.  See Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 
396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he plaintiff bears the initial 
burden of showing that the defendant’s conduct violated 
some clearly established statutory or constitutional right.” 
(emphasis added)).  That is, while issues of fact may preclude 
a definitive finding on the question of whether the plaintiff’s 
rights have been violated, the court must nonetheless decide 
whether the right at issue was clearly established.  Failure to 
do so is error. 
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(1) the harm ultimately caused 
was foreseeable and fairly direct; 
(2) the state actor acted in willful 
disregard for the safety of the 
plaintiff; (3) there existed some 
relationship between the state and 
the plaintiff; (4) the state actors 
used their authority to create an 
opportunity that otherwise would 
not have existed for the [harm] to 
occur. 
95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Mark v. Borough 
of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995)).  As reflected 
in the District Court’s opinion, the state-created-danger 
analysis necessitates a fact-intensive inquiry.   
 Pearson recognized, however, that there are instances 
where a case is most easily resolved by addressing whether 
the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 
violation.  See 555 U.S. at 237; Werkheiser v. Pocono Twp., 
780 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 2015).  We conclude this is such a 
case and will address the second prong of the qualified 
immunity analysis at the outset.    
A.  
 Before deciding whether the constitutional right Spady 
relies upon was clearly established, we must first frame the 
precise contours of that right.  Spady’s claim is derived from 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
reads that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  Spady argues that this case 
implicates a student’s “constitutional right to be free from 
school officials’ deliberate indifference to, or acts that 
increase the risk of serious injury from unjustified invasions 
of bodily integrity[.]”  Appellee’s Br. at 24 (quoting Sciotto v. 
Marple Newton Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 570 (E.D. Pa. 
1999)).   
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 We are mindful, however, that courts are “not to define 
clearly established law at a high level of generality.”  al-Kidd, 
131 S. Ct. at 2084 (citations omitted).  Instead, courts “must 
define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of 
specificity.”  Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 
2012).  Accepting Spady’s broad version of the right at issue 
“would . . . convert the rule of qualified immunity that our 
cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified 
liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract 
rights.”  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).  
We are thus required to frame the right at issue “in a more 
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense,” Anderson, 
483 U.S. at 640, “in light of the case’s specific context, not as 
a broad general proposition,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.   
 In this case, the specific context is a student who 
experiences a brief submersion under water, exits the pool 
and complains of chest pain, is ordered to return to the pool 
after a several-minute respite, then stays in the shallow end of 
the pool for the remainder of the class, and does not exhibit 
signs of serious distress until more than one hour later.  The 
specific constitutional right under the Due Process Clause in 
this context is the right to affirmative intervention by the state 
actor to minimize the risk of secondary or dry drowning.  
And, for qualified immunity purposes, the question is whether 
the law in this context was so well-established that it would 
have been apparent to a reasonable gym teacher that failure to 
take action to assess a non-apparent condition that placed the 
student in mortal danger violated that student’s constitutional 
right under the state-created-danger theory of liability.   
B.  
 In order for a right to be clearly established there must 
be applicable precedent from the Supreme Court, which there 
is not, and even if “‘a robust consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority’ in the Court of Appeals ‘could itself establish the 
federal right’” as Spady alleges, there is no such consensus 
here.  Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per 
curiam) (quoting City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 
1765, 1778 (2015)).  Although Spady does not have to 
produce “a case directly on point, . . . existing precedent must 
10 
 
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate.”  al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).  Stated another way, a court need not find 
that “the very action in question has previously been held 
unlawful,” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, but rather may 
conclude that the firmly settled state of the law, established 
by a forceful body of persuasive precedent, would place a 
reasonable official on notice that his actions obviously 
violated a clearly established constitutional right.  Taylor, 135 
S. Ct. at 2044; al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.   
 Turning to the present matter, no Supreme Court case 
has established a right to adequate safety protocols during 
public-school swimming class.  Indeed, no decision of the 
Supreme Court even discusses the right of students to have 
adequate safety protocols in these settings or in any analogous 
setting.  Spady also concedes that our jurisprudence has not 
recognized a state-created-danger theory on these or similar 
facts.  Nonetheless, Spady argues that our decision in Kneipp 
v. Tedder, and a holding of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in Sciotto v. Marple Newton School District, 
support her argument that the right at issue was clearly 
established.  We address each case in turn.   
 The facts of Kneipp are not even remotely close to the 
facts presented here.  There, several police officers came 
upon an intoxicated couple walking home and stopped them 
for a brief period.  95 F.3d at 1201.  The police observed the 
woman to be drunk—she was having difficulty standing, 
could not follow simple instructions, and smelled of urine.  
Id.  The police officers then sent her male companion home, 
but continued to detain her for an additional period of time.  
Id. at 1202.  The officers later released her from custody to 
walk home alone, and she fell down an embankment, 
sustaining serious injuries.  Id. at 1203.  We held that: 
[T]he state-created danger theory 
is a viable mechanism for 
establishing a constitutional claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  When 
viewed in the light most favorable 
to the legal guardians, the 
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evidence submitted was sufficient 
to raise a triable issue of fact as to 
whether the police officers 
affirmatively placed [Kniepp] in a 
position of danger. 
Id. at 1211.   
 The act of separating a visibly intoxicated person from 
her traveling companion and then forcing her to walk home 
alone—which necessarily increased the obvious risk that she 
would fall and injure herself, id. at 1209—is far afield from 
having a student participate in swim class as part of a regular 
P.E. curriculum.  Consequently, it cannot be the case that 
Kniepp put Rodgers, a public school gym teacher, on notice 
regarding the alleged constitutional violation at issue here.   
 Spady’s reliance on Sciotto is equally unavailing.  That 
case involved a wrestling coach who pitted a 16-year-old, 
110-pound sophomore wrestler against a 22-year-old, 150-
pound former member of a Division I wrestling team.  81 F. 
Supp. 2d at 561–62.  While the two were grappling, the 
college athlete severely injured the victim’s spine, ultimately 
resulting in quadriplegia.  The district court held that “a 
student’s right, in a school setting, to freedom from school 
officials’ deliberate indifference to, or acts that increase the 
risk of serious injury from unjustified invasions of bodily 
integrity perpetrated by third parties” was clearly established 
based on its canvassing of Supreme Court cases and our 
precedent.  Id. at 570.  Sciotto relied principally on Ingraham 
v. Wright, which held “that Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interests are implicated” when a school official imposes 
punishment “by restraining the child and inflicting 
appreciable physical pain,” 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977),5 and 
                                              
5Although recognizing that various constitutional 
rights were implicated by corporal punishment in public 
schools, the Supreme Court held that 
[t]he Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and 
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Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, where we 
recognized “a student’s right to be free from sexual assaults 
by his or her teachers,” 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1989).6   
 We do not deny that Sciotto and this matter present 
heart-wrenching circumstances.  To equate the intentional 
infliction of painful corporal punishment or the sexual 
molestation of a student, however, with a student-athlete’s 
unfortunate accident during wrestling practice or a rare 
                                                                                                     
unusual punishment is 
inapplicable to school paddlings, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
requirement of procedural due 
process is satisfied by Florida’s 
preservation of common-law 
constraints and remedies.  We 
therefore agree with the Court of 
Appeals . . . that petitioners 
cannot recover damages on the 
basis of any Eighth Amendment 
or procedural due process 
violation.   
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 683.   
6 Sciotto also relies upon D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocational Technical School, where we held there was 
no viable state-created-danger claim when students 
committed sexual assaults against other students while in 
school.  972 F.2d 1364, 1374 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).  
Although characterizing it as “an extremely close case,” id., 
we declined to find that failure to properly monitor a 
classroom, which resulted in students being sexually 
assaulted, or to report those sexual assaults to the victims’ 
parents or other authorities made out a constitutional 
violation, id. at 1376.  Rather than lending support to Spady’s 
position, our reluctance to extend Stoneking further illustrates 
its inapplicability to this matter.   
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instance of delayed drowning after swim class is a bridge too 
far.  The case law simply did not inform a reasonable gym 
teacher that the failure to asses a student who briefly goes 
under water for the possibility of dry drowning violated that 
student’s constitutional right to bodily integrity free from 
unwarranted intrusions by the state.7   
 Much like Ingraham and Stoneking, courts that have 
found colorable constitutional violations in school-athletic 
settings did so where state actors engaged in patently 
egregious and intentional misconduct, which is notably absent 
from this case.  For example, in Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton 
County Board of Education, the Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that a student athlete had made out “a violation of his right 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from excessive 
corporal punishment,” 229 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000), 
after a coach struck the student with a blunt object, knocking 
out his left eye, id. at 1071; see also Johnson v. Newburgh 
Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (no 
qualified immunity where gym teacher picked up a student by 
his throat and rammed his head into bleachers and a fuse 
                                              
7 Indeed, when faced with factual scenarios analogous 
to Sciotto—i.e., injuries sustained during school athletic 
activities—several district courts in this circuit have reached 
decidedly different conclusions and declined to find a 
constitutional violation.  See, e.g., Lavella v. Stockhausen, 
No. 13-CV-0127, 2013 WL 1838387 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2013) 
(dismissing civil rights action premised on state-created 
danger after previously concussed cheerleader was struck in 
the head by another cheerleader during practice); Leonard v. 
Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.08-2016, 2009 WL 
603160 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2009) (no state-created danger 
when student was impaled by a javelin thrown by another 
student); Yatsko v. Berezwick, No. 3:06-CV-2480, 2008 WL 
2444503, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2008) (failing to withhold 
a concussed student from returning to a basketball game did 
“not constitute . . . a substantive due process violation”).  
These cases demonstrate there is no vigorous consensus of 
authority to support Sciotto’s broad holding. 
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box).  Such blatantly excessive punishment is far afield from 
the typical risks that are associated with participation in 
athletic activities, see, e.g., Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 
984 (11th Cir. 2009) (no constitutional violation stemming 
from student-athlete’s death after rigorous football practice), 
or even the minimal type of intentional physical contact that, 
while deplorable, will rarely make out a constitutional 
violation, see, e.g., Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 
F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (“While we do not mean to 
suggest that school systems should tolerate a teacher who 
slaps a student in anger, neither do we conclude that one slap, 
even if made for no legitimate purpose, rises to the level of a 
constitutional violation.”).   
 Aside from Kniepp and Sciotto, Spady has “not 
brought to our attention”—and we cannot find—“any cases of 
controlling authority in [any] jurisdiction at the time of the 
incident which clearly established the rule on which [she] 
seek[s] to rely, nor [has she] identified a consensus of cases 
of persuasive authority,” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 
(1999) (modifications added), whereby a reasonable gym 
teacher would have been aware that his actions were 
unconstitutional.8  Accordingly, we hold that Juanya did not 
have a clearly established constitutional right to dry-
drowning-intervention protocols while participating in P.E. 
class.9  Our conclusion is buttressed by numerous rulings 
                                              
8 The closest cases to the present matter we have 
located are Estate of C.A. v. Castro, 547 F. App’x 621 (5th 
Cir. 2013), which involved the drowning death of a student 
during a science experiment, and Langan ex rel. Langan v. 
Grand Rapids Public School System, No. 94-CV-174, 1995 
WL 17009502 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 1995), which concerned 
a student who suffered a neck injury after diving into the 
shallow end of a school’s pool.  Both courts concluded that 
the plaintiffs failed to make out a constitutional claim.  C.A., 
547 F. App’x at 625; Langan, 1995 WL 17009502, at *4.  
Thus, they do not support Spady’s position. 
9 Spady points to a host of safety measures that her 
aquatic expert claims should have been implemented and, 
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from other courts that address injuries caused by public-
school teachers.  See, e.g., Nix v. Franklin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
311 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (11th Cir. 2002) (no viable 
constitutional claim where student died after touching 
exposed high-voltage wire during science experiment); 
Voorhies v. Conroe Ind. Sch. Dist., 610 F. Supp. 868, 873 
(S.D. Tex. 1985) (no constitutional claim where shop teacher 
removed safety guard on a power saw causing student to 
severely lacerate hand).   
 Our holding is also in accord with the traditional limits 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As observed in DeShaney: 
The [Due Process] Clause is 
phrased as a limitation on the 
State’s power to act, not as a 
guarantee of certain minimal 
levels of safety and security. It 
forbids the State itself to deprive 
individuals of life, liberty, or 
property without “due process of 
law,” but its language cannot 
fairly be extended to impose an 
affirmative obligation on the State 
to ensure that those interests do 
not come to harm through other 
means. 
489 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added).  “[H]ard as our sympathies 
may pull us, our duty to maintain the integrity of substantive 
                                                                                                     
potentially, could have averted this tragedy.  Even assuming 
Rodgers was charged with implementing these measures—
rather than the BASD—this argument does nothing to change 
our conclusion that Rodgers is entitled to qualified immunity.  
See Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777 (“[A] plaintiff cannot 
‘avoi[d] summary judgment by simply producing an expert’s 
report’” opining that the state actor’s conduct “was 
imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless.” (quoting 
Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
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law pulls harder.”  Turner v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 292 
F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1961). 
IV.  
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will reverse the 
District Court’s Order of July 30, 2014, denying Rodgers’s 
motion for summary judgment.   
